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Minh-Dung Dang
GET-ENST & LTCI-UMR 5141 CNRS, 46 rue Barrault, 75634 Paris Cedex 13, Frane
(Dated: Deember 13, 2018)
In this paper, we reonsider the ommuniation model used in the no-go theorems on the impos-
sibility of quantum bit ommitment and oblivious transfer. We state that a marosopi lassial
hannel may not be replaed with a quantum hannel whih is used in the redued model proving
the no-go theorems. We show that in some restrited ases, the redued model is inseure while the
original model with a lassial hannel is seure.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
The theorems on the seurity of quantum key dis-
tribution [1, 2℄, following the rst protool of Bennett
and Brassard [3℄, and the theorems on the inseurity of
two-party quantum bit ommitment [4, 5, 6℄, oblivious
transfer and general two-party quantum seure ompu-
tation [7℄ are among the most interesting subjets in the
eld of quantum ryptography.
In a bit ommitment protool, Alie sends the ommit-
ment information about a seret bit to Bob, who annot
disover the bit, and when Alie is supposed to reveal
the bit, Bob an detet if Alie hanges the value of the
bit. Oblivious transfer is a omputation protool where
Alie enters two seret bits, Bob enters a hoie to gain
only one of these while Alie annot know Bob's hoie.
Coin ipping is a protool for Alie and Bob sharing a
fairly random bits, i.e. none of the parties an aet the
probability distribution of the outome.
These three primitives are used to onstrut seure
omputation for generi two-party funtions [8℄. Classi-
ally, bit ommitment implements oin ipping and is im-
plemented by oblivious transfer [9℄, while oblivious trans-
fer an be built from bit ommitment by transmitting
quantum information [10, 11℄.
With the introdution of quantum information [12℄,
ryptographers were willing to build unonditionally se-
ure bit ommitment [3, 13℄. But the rst no-go theorem
eliminated these proposals [4, 5℄. This knok alerted peo-
ple about the provable seurity of other two-party pro-
tools, inluding key distribution. While quantum key
distribution is proved to be seure [1, 2℄, two other no-go
theorems were issued: quantum seure two-party ompu-
tation and so oblivious transfer are impossible [7℄; quan-
tum oin ipping with arbitrarily small bias is impossi-
ble [14℄. We an add to the list another no-go result:
quantum bit ommitment annot be built from oin ip-
ping [15℄.
These no-go theorems exeute the protools on a quan-
tum two-party model. This model is proposed rst by
Yao, and onsists of a quantum mahine on Alie side
interating with a quantum mahine on Bob side via a
quantum mahine [11, 16℄. The global states, or images,
of a protool are then desribed in a joint spae of Alie
sideHA, Bob sideHB and the quantum hannelHC . The
states of the exeution an be mixed states, but all loal
random hoie and omputation made by Alie and Bob
an be puried and kept at the quantum level [4, 5, 7℄.
The global state is then desribed by a pure state in a
larger spae HA′ ⊗ HC ⊗ HB′ where HA′ ,HB′ are ex-
tended from HA,HB to purify the random hoies and
measurements. Adopting the option that parts of the
hannel are ontrolled by one of the two partiipants,
the no-go theorems onverts the state of the joint om-
putation (at a moment) into a bipartite state of joint
spae HA′′ ⊗HB′′ = (HA′ ⊗HCA)⊗ (HCB ⊗HB′) where
HCA,HCB are the hannel parts respetively ontrolled
by Alie and Bob. In suh a bipartite spae, bit ommit-
ment and oblivious transfer are impossible.
In this paper, I try to ritiize the appliation of the no-
go theorems to all possible two-party protools, inluding
quantum-lassial mixed protools. In fat, a speied
protool with lassial messages would rather be imple-
mented on a real physial model with a lassial hannel.
We state that a lassial hannel an be marosopi and
annot be ontrolled by any partiipants in terms of pu-
riation. It should be viewed as a measurement whih
is trusted by both Alie and Bob. I give some restrited
ases where the no-go theorems are valid with quantum
ommuniations but not with quantum-lassial mixed
ommuniations.
This ritique is not to say that quantum bit ommit-
ment is possible. Indeed, another reonsideration of bit
ommitment on a omplete model was made reently [17℄,
and we should wait for reviews to onrm the results.
First, in Setion II, we do a revision on the no-go the-
orems of Mayers, Lo & Chau and the quantum model
used in their proofs. With the same arguments, in Se-
tion III, we extend the no-go theorems with presene of
a partiular quantum trusted third-party. By this ex-
tension of the no-go theorems for a partiular quantum
trusted third-party model, I show a result similar to [15℄:
bit ommitment and oblivious transfer annot be built
upon oin ipping with purely quantum ommuniations.
Then, in Setion V, we re-question about the arguments
of Mayers, Lo & Chau in reduing general protools from
the mixed model with a lassial hannel to the purely
quantum model. In that setion, we propose a gener-
alized model to adopt a real lassial hannel, and we
2give a partiular ase-study where the no-go theorems
are valid with purely quantum ommuniations but not
with mixed ommuniations.
In the following, we will use shortly protools for
all protools with quantum-lassial mixed ommunia-
tions while quantum protools for protools with purely
quantum ommuniations.
II. QUANTUM MODEL AND NO-GO
THEOREMS
A. Quantum model
In [11℄, for proving the seurity of bit-ommitment-
based quantum oblivious transfer, Yao dened a quan-
tum two-party protool as a pair of quantum mahines
interating through a quantum hannel.
The protool is then exeuted on a joint system on-
sisting of Alie's mahine HA, Bob's mahine HB , and
the quantum hannel HC . Initially, eah partiipant pre-
pares a state for its private system and the hannel is
in state |0〉. The exeution is alternating rounds of one-
way ommuniations. For eah round of one partiipant
D ∈ {A,B}, this performs a omputation on the joint
spae of his private system HD and the messages HC .
The messages will be taken to the loation of the other
for the next round.
FIG. 1: Quantum two-party model
This model is general for all quantum protools, and
has been widely used for analyzing quantum protools,
e.g. the omplexity of quantum ommuniation [16, 18℄
and quantum interative proofs [19℄.
B. No-go theorems
The no-go theorems used the quantum model of Yao
to prove the inseurity of two-party protools.
For protools with quantum-lassial mixed ommu-
niations, Yao said Although the above desription is
general enough to inorporate lassial omputations and
transmissions of lassial information, it is useful to sep-
arate out the lassial parts in desribing protools [11℄.
But his model was then widely used for all quantum-
lassial mixed protools. The arguments is that a las-
sial bit an be transmitted as a qubit. Mayers expliitly
explained this kind of quantum ommuniation for las-
sial information [5℄.
Beause all random hoies are made by either Alie or
Bob, these two partiipant an keep the random hoies
at the quantum level by holding the entanglement with
the quantum oins. Indeed, the fat that a partiipant
puries or not his random variables does not hange the
orretness of the protool and the heating strategy of
the other. All of loal omputations an be also kept at
the quantum level by delaying measurements to the nal
step. Thus, the global images of the the omputation
an be desribed by a pure state lying on a larger spae
purifying all loal random variables and measurements:
HA′ ⊗HC ⊗HB′ . The exeution of the protool is then
a well speied unitary transformation of the input state
into the output state, and surprisingly deterministi.
In the quantum model, at eah moment between two
rounds of ommuniation, any quantum part of the han-
nel must lie on either Alie or Bob side. Thus, the global
image at any moment an be onsidered as a state lying in
a bipartite spae HA′′ ⊗HB′′ = HA′⊗HCA⊗HCB⊗HB′
where HCD is for the hannel part held by partiipant
D ∈ {A,B}.
Then, at the onsidered moment, the partial images of
the omputations on Alie and Bob sides are
ρA
′′
= trB′′(ρ), ρ
B′′ = trA′′(ρ),
where ρ is the global image whih is a pure state in the
global spae HA′′ ⊗HB′′ .
For the seurity of bit ommitment on Bob side, the
partial images on Bob side at the moment before the
opening phase must idential for the ommitments of 0
and 1:
trA′′(ρ0) = trA′′(ρ1)·
The no-go theorem on bit ommitment is issued by a the-
orem that states that, in suh a ase, there exists a loal
unitary transformation on HA′′ that transforms ρ0 to ρ1.
Alie an then swith the omputation before opening
the seret bit [4, 5℄.
For the seurity of one-sided omputation, Lo disov-
ered that if the protool is seure against Alie, then Bob
has a loal unitary transformation, independent from Al-
ie's input, that helps Bob to learn the results omputed
from all of possible loal inputs [7℄.
3We revise here Lo's theorem for one-sided omputa-
tion. In fat, to ompute f(i, j), Alie and Bob run to-
gether a unitary U transformation on Alie's input |i〉 :
i ∈ {i1, .., im} joint with Bob's input |j〉 : j ∈ {j1, .., jn}.
Other known loal variables an be omitted without gen-
eralization. At the end, Bob an learn the result from
the output state |vij〉 = U(|i〉A ⊗ |j〉B). But Alie an
entangle her input A with a private quantum die P , i.e.
prepares the initial state
1√
n
∑
i |i〉P ⊗ |iA〉.
If Bob inputs j1 then the initial state for the protool
is
|u′〉in =
1√
n
∑
i
|i〉P ⊗ |iA〉 ⊗ |j1〉B , (1)
and at the end, the output state is
|vj1〉 =
1√
n
∑
i
|i〉P ⊗ U(|iA〉 ⊗ |j1〉B)·
Similarly, if Bob inputs j2 then the output state is
|vj2〉 =
1√
n
∑
i
|i〉P ⊗ U(|iA〉 ⊗ |j2〉B)·
For the seurity on Alie side, the partial images must
be idential, i.e.
trB(|vj1〉 〈vj1 |) = trB(|vj2 〉 〈vj2 |)
and then, there exists a loal unitary transformation
U j1,j2 on Bob loal system suh that
|vj2〉 = U j1,j2 |vj1〉 ·
Therefore, beause P 〈i| vj〉 = 1√n |vij〉, the transforma-
tion U j1,j2 is universal for all Alie input i:
|vij2〉 = U j1,j2 |vij1〉 ·
Bob an enter |j1〉, omputes |vij1 〉 and measures it to
learn f(i, j1). However, to enable Bob to unambiguously
get the result, |vij1〉 must not be perturbed by his mea-
surement. Bob an transform it to |vij2〉 by U j1,j2 , mea-
sures to learn f(i, j2), and so on.
More strongly, imperfet protools are also banned
from reahing an arbitrarily high seurity. There exist
always a trade-o between the seurity on one side and
the inseurity on the other side [20℄.
III. EXTENSIONS OF NO-GO THEOREMS FOR
THE QUANTUM MODEL
In this setion, we suppose an honest third-party that
helps Alie and Bob to do some omputations. We de-
ne a quantum trusted third-party as a quantum devie
that an help Alie and Bob to do any required omputa-
tion. The third-party an used some loal pure variables
for the omputations. The loal variables of the trusted
party are initialized to |0〉. At the end of the required
omputation, the third-party splits all of the outputs, in-
luded the loal variables, into two parts, redirets one
part to Alie, and one part to Bob, f. gure 2. The exe-
ution time of the omputation done by the third-party is
a elementary unit, and we an onsider as it immediately
returns the results to the partiipants.
FIG. 2: The quantum trusted third-party
With suh a trusted third-party, we an extend the
results of [4, 5, 7℄ for the quantum model:
Theorem 1 (Extension of no-go theorem on bit
ommitment). Quantum bit ommitment is inseure
even with help of the speied quantum trusted third-
party.
Theorem 2 (Extension of no-go theorem on seure
omputations). Quantum two-party seure omputa-
tions are inseure even with help of the speied quantum
trusted third-party.
In fat, when the third-party uses only pure states as
loal input, and immediately, splits and sends all of the
qubits whih partiipate to the omputations to Alie
and Bob, the global state at any onsidered moment is
in some known pure state, aording to the algorithm,
in a bipartite spae relating only Alie and Bob sides.
Therefore, the no-go theorems remain valid.
For example, to prove the later theorem for one-sided
seure omputation. We start with equation (1). Attah-
ing a pure state |0〉A′B′ , loally prepared by the third-
party, the initial state is
|u′〉in =
1√
n
∑
i
|i〉P ⊗ |i〉A ⊗ |j1〉B ⊗ |0〉A′B′ ·
At the end of the omputation, with help of the third-
party, the ombined system is in state
|vj1〉 = 1√
n
∑
i
|i〉P ⊗ U(|i〉A ⊗ |j1〉B ⊗ |0〉A′B′)
where system A′ is set to A, system B′ is set to B after
the split. Therefore, the remaining arguments of Lo's
proofs an be followed, f. Setion II B.
4IV. IS COIN FLIPPING WEAKER THAN BIT
COMMITMENT?
As a orollary of the extensions of the no-go theorems,
f. Setion III, we onlude that
Corollary 1. In the quantum model, Coin Flipping is
weaker than Bit Commitment and Oblivious Transfer.
In [15℄, Kent shown a similar result. In his paper, he
established a relativist model to implement oin ipping.
With an assumed quantum trusted party, we made the
model more omprehensible from a non-relativist point
of view.
It's beause we an suppose a trusted third-party that
reates a pair of qubits in Bell state |Φ+〉 and sends eah
part to an user. In suh a model, oin ipping is realizable
while bit ommitment and oblivious transfer are not with
quantum ommuniation, as shown by Theorems 1, 2.
V. QUANTUM MODEL IS NOT TO PROVE
THE INSECURITY
A. Quantum-lassial mixed model
What is the dierene between the two hannel? A
quantum hannel is a medium that we an used to trans-
mit diretly a quantum state without disturbing it while
a lassial hannel permits only one of two disrete values
for a lassial bit. For example a marosopi eletrial
wire with tension +5V for 0 and −5V for 1. It is natural
that in reality, a lassial hannel is well oupled with the
environment, and the deoherene is so strong that only
|0〉 or |1〉 is aepted, in terms of quantum information.
Imagine that in the speiation of a protool, at a
ertain moment, a party has to measure some results of
its quantum omputation and send the resulting lassi-
al messages to the other party. With a marosopi
lassial hannel, the measurement must be arried out.
The sender an also memorize the emitted message. It is
onvenient to see the lassial hannel as a trusted mea-
surement mahine: the sender sends the qubits to the
mahine that measures, doubles the output state, whih
is an eigenstate and loneable, sends one opy to the re-
eiver and one opy bak to the sender for memorizing
it.
Yao's model should be generalized for two-party proto-
ols as a pair of quantum mahines interating through
a quantum hannel and neessarily a lassial hannel.
The model is also alternating rounds of one-way om-
muniations. In eah round, a partiipant D ∈ {A,B}
performs a omputation on the joint spae of his pri-
vate system HD, the quantum messages HC the lassial
messages HRM ,D reeived from the trusted measurement
mahine M , and the messages HSM ,D to be sent to the
measurement mahine for produing lassial messages.
For simplifying, the measurement mahine should not
opy the output. This task an be arried out by the
sender. In fat, measuring a state a |0〉+ b |1〉, the above
mahine produes |00〉 or |11〉. Instead, the sender an
reate a |00〉 + b |11〉, sends the rst qubit to the ma-
hine that measures it and sends the output state to the
reeiver. By this way, the sender keep a opy of the mea-
surement.
Therefore, the model is simplied, and onsists of two
mahinesHA,HB , a quantum hannelHC for both quan-
tum and lassial messages and a trusted measurement
mahine M with anillas HM . The measurement is in
fat a CNOT-like gate whose ontrolling inputs are in
the spae of the sender's lassial messages and targets
are anillas in the marosopi environment spae HM ,
f. gure 3.
In eah ommuniation round, a partiipant D ∈
{A,B} does an unitary omputation on HD′ ⊗HC where
HD′ is extended from HD to purify loal variables and
measurements; the trusted mahine applies the CNOT
gate to the lassial messages in HC and the environ-
ment of the lassial hannel HM . The quantum mes-
sages and lassial messages in HC of the round are
taken to the other loation for the next round. HM is
not ontrolled by any partiipant.
FIG. 3: Mixed model
B. Is the redution ogent?
It is obvious that all protools an be orretly im-
plemented on the quantum model by replaing lassial
bits by qubits. By this way, a protool is seure if its
simulating quantum protool is seure. It's reasonable to
use simulating quantum protools to prove the seurity of
original protools [11℄. But, vie-versa, it is not evident.
Unfortunately, the no-go theorems used the simulating
quantum protools to prove the inseurity of original pro-
tools.
For example, in the speiation of a mixed protool, a
partiipant makes the measurement of its omputation to
5FIG. 4: Quantum vs. Mixed models
produe a lassial message, sends the messages via a the
lassial hannel whih reprodues a orresponding state
in the omputation basis for the other partiipant. In
the model of the speiation with a marosopi hannel
for sending lassial message, the reeiver really reeives
one of the eigen-states of the measurement made by the
sender.
While, by simulating with a quantum hannel, the
sender equivalently reates a quantum mixed state as
the sum of the above measurement eigen-states weighted
by the orresponding probabilities. However, the sender
an prepare this mixed state as part of a bipartite pure
entangled state. We see this by iting to an early sim-
ple example: at a ertain moment, a partiipant gets
a |0〉 + b |1〉, measures it and sends the result, either |0〉
with probability a2 or |1〉 with probability b2. This las-
sial message is desribed in terms of quantum informa-
tion as a2 |0〉 〈0|+b2 |0〉 〈0|. With a quantum hannel, the
sender an send (a |0〉+b |1〉)⊗|0〉C through a CNOT gate
to make (a |0〉 ⊗ |0〉C + b |1〉 ⊗ |1〉C) and send qubit C to
the reeiver.
The above quantum ommuniation of lassial mes-
sages gave to the partiipants an extra entanglement that
does not exist in the speiation of the protool with
mixed ommuniations. Indeed, this entanglement ould
be used as a powerful attak. We will expliitly expose
this with a ase-study where, if the reeiver used the re-
eived message to do some quantum omputation and
sends bak the result, the sender ould learn more infor-
mation with entanglement attak by the eet of super-
dense oding [21℄.
Suh an bipartite entanglement should be destroyed by
the measurement of the lassial hannel. In our model
for the lassial hannel, the sender has to send qubit
C to the measurement mahine of the lassial hannel
that makes instead the state (a |0〉⊗ |0〉M ⊗|0〉C + b |1〉⊗
|1〉M ⊗ |1〉C) and sends qubit C to the reeiver.
From a global view, one an see that if the two par-
ties follow a protool using a dened lassial hannel,
the global system should lie in a tripartite spaes joining
HA⊗HC,A, HB ⊗HC,B and HM . The ruial argument
that the whole system is desribed in a bipartite spae,
used in the proofs of the no-go theorems [4, 5, 7℄, is not
valid in the mixed model, f. gure 4.
All of the proposed quantum bit ommitment proto-
ols fall into the quantum model [3, 13, 22℄, where all
ommuniations are realized with quantum messages ex-
ept the nal step to open the ommitted bit. Then, they
are diretly attaked by the no-go theorems [4, 5, 6℄.
Maybe, unonditionally seure bit ommitment is also
impossible in the mixed model, as onluded by a reent
study in a preprint paper of Mauro d'Ariano et al. [17℄,
but the arguments used in Mayer and Lo & Chau proofs
for all possible protools are not evident.
We think that, the inseurity of a protool should be
onsidered when implementing it on a quantum-lassial
mixed model that math better the real world. Normally,
a marosopi lassial hannel is oupled with a trusted
environment and measures the quantum messages sent
through it. We expet that, to be more onvining, no-
go theorems should be proved for the mixed model we
proposed in the previous setion.
C. Case-study: an honest third-party O-OT gate
Let verify a quantum oblivious transfer protool with
a pure trusted party, f. III. In our protool, the pure
trusted party uses tree loal qubits. For simplifying, we
initialize the rst and the seond qubit to be entangled
and in state |Φ+〉. In fat, the trusted party an pre-
pare this state from |00〉 by a doing pi/2 rotation on the
rst qubit and sending the two qubit through CNOT gate
whose target is the seond qubit. The third qubit is ini-
tialized to |0〉.
Inspired from Bennett et al. [23℄, we use the notations:
0˜0 = |Φ+〉 = (|00〉+ |11〉)/
√
2,
0˜1 = |Φ−〉 = (|00〉 − |11〉)/
√
2,
1˜0 = |Ψ+〉 = (|01〉+ |10〉)/
√
2,
1˜1 = |Ψ−〉 = (|01〉 − |10〉)/
√
2·
Let b0, b1 be the two bits that Alie want to send and
c be Bob's hoie. The trusted party does a ontrolled pi
rotation Rb0b1 on the rst qubit, aording to b0, b1:
R00 = I, R01 = σz , R10 = σx, R11 = σy ·
6The rst and seond qubits are obtained in state b˜0b1.
Next, the trusted party applies the bilateral pi/2 rotation
By to the rst and seond qubits in ase c = 1 [23℄:
0˜0→By 0˜0,
0˜1→By 1˜0,
1˜0→By 0˜1,
1˜1→By 1˜1·
The trusted party applies then the CNOT gate whose
ontrolling input is the rst qubit and the target is the
third qubit. Finally, the trusted party splits the outputs,
sends bak Alie's qubits with his rst loal qubit to Al-
ie, and sends bak Bob's qubit with its seond and third
loal qubits to Bob, f. gure 5.
FIG. 5: A third-party gate for O-OT protool
In ase Alie and Bob ommuniate with the trusted
party via quantum hannels, they an send diretly quan-
tum inputs. The omputation of the trusted party is a
quantum iruit ating on 6 qubits: two for Alie's in-
puts, tree for the loal qubits, one for Bob's input. Alie
an prepare a superposition
1
2
(|00〉+ |01〉+ |10〉+ |11〉)·
The global input state is then
|in〉 = 1
2
(|00〉A + |01〉A + |10〉A + |11〉A) |Φ+〉T |0〉T |c〉B ·
If Bob sends |c〉 = |0〉 then the omputation is
|in〉 →Rb0b1
1
2
[ |00〉A 0˜0T + |01〉A 0˜1T
+ |10〉A 1˜0T + |11〉A 1˜1T ] |0〉T |0〉B
→By
1
2
√
2
[ |00〉A (|00〉T + |11〉T )
+ |01〉A (|00〉T − |11〉T )
+ |10〉A (|01〉T + |10〉T )+
|11〉A (|01〉T − |10〉T )] |0〉T |0〉B
→CNOT 1
2
√
2
[ |00〉A (|000〉T + |111〉T )
+ |01〉A (|000〉T − |111〉T )
+ |10〉A (|010〉T + |101〉T )
+ |11〉A (|010〉T − |101〉T )] |0〉B
→split 1
2
√
2
[(|000〉A + |010〉A) |000〉B
+ (|001〉A − |011〉A) |110〉B
+ (|100〉A + |110〉A) |100〉B
+ (|101〉A − |111〉A) |010〉B]·
If Bob sends |c〉 = |1〉 then the omputation is
|in〉 →Rb0b1
1
2
[ |00〉A 0˜0T + |01〉A 0˜1T+
|10〉A 1˜0T + |11〉A 1˜1T ] |0〉T |1〉B
→By
1
2
√
2
[ |00〉A (|00〉T + |11〉T )
+ |01〉A (|01〉T + |10〉T )
+ |10〉A (|00〉T − |11〉T )
+ |11〉A (|01〉T − |10〉T )] |0〉T |1〉B
→CNOT 1
2
√
2
[ |00〉A (|000〉T + |111〉T )
+ |01〉A (|010〉T + |101〉T )
+ |10〉A (|000〉T − |111〉T )
+ |11〉A (|010〉T − |101〉T )] |1〉B
→split 1
2
√
2
[(|000〉A + |100〉A) |001〉B
+ (|001〉A − |101〉A) |111〉B
+ (|010〉A + |110〉A) |100〉B
+ (|011〉A − |111〉A) |011〉B]·
We see that the redued density matries at Alie's loa-
tion are dierent for the two ases, and so c is not seure
against Alie.
However, if Alie and Bob are subjeted to send b0, b1, c
to T via lassial hannels, f. gure 6. The inputs
will be measured and projeted onto the omputation
basis. For example on Alie side, simply speaking,
Alie inputs |b0b1〉 an only take one of the 4 values
|00〉 , |01〉 , |10〉 , |11〉 and for any of these ases, Alie an-
not disover c. Using the dened model for the lassi-
al hannel, Alie sends her inputs through CNOT gates
7FIG. 6: Third-party gate for O-OT protool with lassial
hannels
whose targets are in the measurement mahine M of the
lassial hannel. The output is entangled with M . The
nal states of the omputations for c = 0 and c = 1 are
|out0〉 = 1
2
√
2
[ (|000〉A |00〉M + |010〉A |01〉M ) |000〉B
+(|001〉A |00〉M − |011〉A |01〉M ) |110〉B
+(|100〉A |10〉M + |110〉A |11〉M ) |100〉B
+(|101〉A |10〉M − |111〉A |11〉M ) |010〉B],
|out1〉 = 1
2
√
2
[ (|000〉A |00〉M + |100〉A |10〉M ) |001〉B
+(|001〉A |00〉M − |101〉A |10〉M ) |111〉B
+(|010〉A |01〉M + |110〉A |11〉M ) |100〉B
+(|011〉A |01〉M − |111〉A |11〉M ) |011〉B]·
The redued matries of tree qubits at Alie loation are
gained by traing out M part and B part, and beome
I/8 for both two values of c.
Similar analyses on Bob side shows that the protool
is also seure. Therefore, with help of lassial ommu-
niations, the protool beomes seure on both sides.
VI. SUMMARY
Our arguments were based on the dierene between
ommuniating lassial information in a lassial man-
ner and in a quantum manner.
The disussions take us bak to a similar problem
of Shrodinger's Cat [24℄. Imagine that Alie owns a
Shrodinger Box, and at a ertain moment, has to tell
Bob whether the at is dead or alive.
If Alie and Bob live in a same publi environment,
e.g. in a same room, Alie does this via a lassial han-
nel, e.g. the aousti hannel: Alie has to open the box
and sound what she sees. It is equivalent to as though
they open the box together, f. gure 7. In another
way, Alie an give the box to Bob and let him open
it. However, Bob an open the box in a private environ-
ment. We an say that Alie and Bob live in two separate
quantum worlds. Imagine that Alie and Bob live in two
FIG. 7: Telling the at's state via a lassial publi environ-
ment
isolated rooms. Alie puts the observable hole of her box
through the wall into Bob's room, and the two rooms re-
main always isolated, f. gure 8. It is as though Bob's
measurement devies are thrown to a private quantum
spae.
FIG. 8: Telling the at's state via private environments
We see that, within the lassial onepts, a lassial
message transmitted from Alie to Bob must be om-
prehensible by both parties in a same referene frame.
It is due to a lassial hannel as a ommon environment
that both Alie and Bob refer to. Classial information
an be viewed as quantum information, but measured by
this referene environment. All quantum measurement
devies making lassial messages in a protool between
Alie and Bob must be thrown to this trusted Hilbert
spae. In this paper, we have used these onepts of
ommuniation of lassial information, as in the former
ase of telling the at's state.
8Nevertheless, in the purely quantum model used by
Mayers and Lo & Chau, there is no suh a ommon spae,
and the measurement devies of eah party for mak-
ing lassial information are thrown to a private Hilbert
spae of that party [5℄.
Another example is the dierene between the result of
the tossing of a lassial random bit and the splitting of
the EPR pair |Φ+〉. We see that the result of tossing of
a random bit is a pair of (0A, 0B) or (1A, 1B) with equal
probability 1/2. In terms of quantum information, the
random bits are desribed by the density matrix:
rAB =
1
2
|0A0B〉 〈0A0B|+ 1
2
|1A1B〉 〈1A1B| ·
On the other hand, the EPR pair is
|Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|0A0B〉+ |1A1B〉)
The two states are indeed dierent. The EPR pair really
implements the tossing only when Alie and Bob have
a ommon referene, for example measurement devies
oupled with a ommon environment that projet eah
qubit to a same basis {|0〉 , |1〉}. This measurement is
trusted by both party, and used as a Hilbert spae HM
of referene, and the measurement devies an be thrown
to it. The measurement of the EPR pair gives
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|0A0B0M 〉+ |1A1B0M 〉),
and Alie and Bob get exatly a pair of random bits rAB:
trM (|ψ〉 〈ψ|) = 1
2
|0A0B〉 〈0A0B|+ 1
2
|1A1B〉 〈1A1B| ·
With the above onepts of ommuniating lassial
information, we summarize that
• A general protool, speied with lassial and
quantum messages an be orretly implemented
in the quantum model with only a quantum han-
nel. We an say that the original protool is seure
if the simulating protool in the quantum model is
seure. However, we have no right to use the simu-
lating protool in the quantum model to prove the
inseurity of the original protool. We should on-
sider its inseurity in a model that would math
better the real world with quantum and lassial
hannels.
• We supposed that a lassial hannel is normally
well oupled with the environment and may not be
ontrolled by neither Alie nor Bob. It is onvenient
to see it as a trusted measurement whih sends bak
the lassial outomes to Alie and Bob.
• We shown that in some speial ases, the original
protool is seure in presene of a lassial hannel
while its simulating protool in the purely quantum
model is inseure.
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